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Institutions, Family and Economic Performance 
 
Alejandro Cid de Orta – Ignacio Presno Amestoy - Luis Viana Martorell 
Universidad de Montevideo1 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It is usual to formulate policies that react on the consequences, not the causes of 
family structure.  In the design of policies, it is important to consider that institutions 
evolve in response to individual incentives and affect the performance of political and 
economic systems. Formal rules influence transaction and production costs (costs for 
families to offer their services) and could induce development or economic stagnation in 
the long run. It is necessary to work on incentives toward efficient institutions. 
 
The purposes of this paper are: a)  to analyse the family trends in past decades; 
b) to consider the economic externalities of the family (child rearing and human capital 
investment; social assistance for the elderly, sick and unemployed; economies of scale; 
mechanism of socialization) and how they are affected by the recent trends of 
households decisions; c) to identify policies related directly and indirectly on the 
families structure that could be fostering or preventing faster economic growth in the 
long run; d) to suggest some new directions for policies that could affect households 
decisions.  
 
Households have experienced enormous changes. However, they are still crucial 
to a well functioning economy and society: the families play a major role in human 
capital investment and these investments in people are an essential ingredient to 
economic progress.  
   
 
JEL Classification: J12, J13 
 
Key words: family economics; population; human capital; institutions and 
economics. 
 
 
                                              
1  The authors are extremely grateful to Franco De Crescenzo for his support in the edition of this paper. 
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 2 
“Without the appropriate institutions, no market economy is 
possible” (Coase 1994, 6) 
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I. Family Structure: World Trends 
 
 
a.  Latin -American Countries 
 
Attanasio (2003) shows that many Latin -American countries have recently 
experienced an intensive transformation process in family structure and household 
decisions. Household decisions affecting family structure can vary across income 
groups, across generations, across points of life cycle. The most significant 
transformations are: 
 
· Increase in the labour force participation of women 
· Growth in the number of divorces 
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· Drop in the number of children for younger cohorts. 
· Increase in the proportion of individuals over 65 years of age. 
· People have been waiting longer to get married (pushing to a later point in the 
household’s life, the peak of the number of children per household). 
· Lower fertility rates  
 
Attanasio and Székely (2003) show that although children live mainly in nuclear 
households (58 percent in the 1993-1997 generation), the proportion that live in 
extended ones has increased (from 30 percent before 1993 to 36 percent for those born 
1993-1997).  
 
 
b. Developed Countries 
 
“Starting in the mid-1960s, in North America, Europe, and Australia, there was 
an upheaval across the whole set of demographic indicators. It came on so rapidly that 
it caught even professional demographers by surprise: birth rates and marriage rates 
fell, while divorce rates, birth of children out of marriage, and the incidence of non-
marital cohabitation rose to high levels. Louis Roussel of the French National 
Demographic Institute correctly characterized the changes as widespread, profound, 
and sudden: widespread, because all “industrialized” nations have been affected to 
varying degrees; profound, because the changes involved increases or decreases of 
more than fifty percent; and sudden, because the changes took place in less than twenty 
years” (Glendon, 2004). 
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A list of European countries according to the incidence of 
some types of family units in the 90's 
 
     
% of couples without 
children 
% of couples 
with children 
 % of single-parent units 
(a) 
      
Sweden 58,0 Spain 68,1 Ireland 14,8 (83) 
Finland 50,2 Ireland 66,3 Norway 14,5 (85) 
Denmark 45,4 Portugal 62,8 Belgium 13,5 (80) 
Switzerland 41,8 Italy 62,6 United 
Kingdom 
13,0 (84) 
United 
Kingdom 
39,4 Greece 62,2 Austria 12,4 (86) 
Germany 38,7 Luxembourg 57,1 Italy 11,4 (76) 
Netherlands 36,1 Norway 54,9 Luxembourg 11,2 (82) 
France 35,5 France 54,2 Germany 10,5 (81) 
Belgium 33,8 Austria 54,1 France 10,2 (85) 
Austria 33,6 Netherlands 53,7 Netherlands  10,1 (76) 
Luxembourg  31,6 Belgium 52,7 Spain 10,0 (86) 
Norway 30,5 Germany 50,8 Denmark 9,8 (84) 
Greece 30,1 Switzerland 50,2 Portugal 8,6 (86) 
Portugal 28,6 United 
Kingdom 
47,7 Switzerland 8,0 (84) 
Italy 25,9 Denmark 44,8 Greece 7,6 (80) 
Spain  21,9 Finland 43,0 Finland 6,8 (87) 
Ireland 19,0 Sweden 35,7 Sweden 6,3 (86) 
(a) In brackets shows the % of mothers with children on the 
total of single-parents units 
 
Source: Blangiardo 2001 (elaboration in Eurostat data, 
Annuaire Demógraphique, 1997) 
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A list of European countries according to some structural 
characteristics of the families in the 90's 
   
        
Average number of 
components 
% of single-person 
families 
% of units 
with children 
 Average number of 
children per unit (a) 
        
Sweden 2,1 Sweden 39,4 Ireland 80,9 Ireland 2,5 
Denmark 2,2 Denmark 34,4 Spain 78,1 Spain 2,0 
Switzerland 2,3 Norway 34,3 Italy 73,5 United 
Kingdom 
1,9 
Finland 2,4 Germany 33,6 Portugal 70,1 Netherlands 1,9 
Norway 2,4 Switzerland 32,4 Greece 69,8 France 1,9 
Netherlands 2,4 Finland 31,7 Austria  66,9 Sweden 1,8 
Austria 2,5 Netherlands  29,9 Luxembourg 66,7 Portugal 1,8 
Belgium 2,5 Austria 29,7 Belgium 66,2 Greece 1,8 
Germany 2,5 Belgium 28,4 France 64,3 Finland 1,8 
United 
Kingdom 
2,5 France 27,1 Finland 64,1 Switzerland 1,8 
France 2,6 United 
Kingdom 
26,7 Netherlands 63,7 Belgium 1,8 
Luxembourg  2,6 Luxembourg  25,5 Germany 61,9 Luxembourg 1,7 
Italy 2,8 Italy 20,6 United 
Kingdom 
60,8 Italy 1,7 
Greece 3,0 Ireland 20,2 Switzerland 58,1 Austria 1,7 
Portugal 3,1 Greece 16,2 Norway 53,5 Denmark 1,6 
Spain  3,3 Portugal 13,8 Denmark 47,2 Germany 1,6 
Ireland 3,3 Spain 13,4 Sweden 46,9 Norway na 
(a) Children of every age are considered except for: Denmark, Finland and Norway (< 18 
years), Luxembourg (< 25 years) and Sweden (< 16 years) 
        
        
Source: Blangiardo 2001 (elaboration in Eurostat data, 
Annuaire Demógraphique, 1997) 
   
 
 
Now, consider the cases of United Kingdom and Spain. 
 
Kate Smith2 illustrates the British case: “Although the results also indicate that 
the nuclear traditional household, compounded by married parents and children, are still 
the most common scenario for child raising, the referred trends combine themselves  
together to produce an increasing variety in the conformation of families. Through each 
consecutive cohort it is more frequent to find single-parent households (generally 
constituted by the mothers) and a complex diversity of situations with compounded 
families”. 
 
                                              
2 Smith, Kate. “Medio siglos de cambios en la familia: evidencia aportada por tres cohortes de nacimiento 
británicas” in (UNICEF - UDELAR 2003)  
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In this sense, we can also observe the Spanish case3. From 1998 until 2002, the 
number of married couples decreased form 5.22 to 5.07 per thousand inhabitants, while 
the number of divorces rose from 0.91 to 1.01 per thousand inhabitants. The fertility 
rate in Spain (1.25 children per woman in 2001) is one of the lowest in the whole world 
and the minimum within the European Union. The Spanish rate fell below the threshold 
of replacement (2.1 percent in 1981), and it has been registering an almost continuous 
decline. Another fact to consider is that the 19.5 percent of children born in 2001 
occurred out of wedlock. Moreover, it is also observed an augmentation of the average 
age at getting married accompanied with a procrastination in having the first child. 
 
 
c. The Uruguayan Case  
 
Uruguay has also experienced many of these changes. Attanasio and Székely 
(2003) resume them as follows: 
 
· Sharp decline in fertility levels long before its neighbours (2.3 children 
per woman in the 1990’s);  
· Ageing population (the over-65s are 13 percent of the total population); 
· Waiting longer to get married; 
· Growth in the number of divorces; 
· Increase in the labour force participation of women (“For example, 74 
percent of women born in 1953-67 are active at age 35-44, which is 14 
percentage points higher than in the 1942-45 cohorts at that age”). 
 
 
STYLISED FACTS 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education and Culture. General Registry Office. 
                                              
3 Aceprensa 21/04, February 11th. 2004. 
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Figure 1 shows the ratio of divorces to wed locks in Uruguay from 1961 until 2002. 
This ratio presents an ascending trend in the whole period, climbing from around 8 
percent in 1961 to around 48 percent in 2002. This stylised fact is attributed to two 
causes. On one hand, the number of divorces has increased from 1,798 in 1961 to 6,761 
in 2002. On the other hand, the number of married couples in Uruguay has reduced 
from 21,561 to 14,073 during the same period. It is interesting to consider that the latter 
partially results from the fact that over time more people have been chosen to form an 
informal relationship instead of getting married. The proportion of informal unions in 
total of couples rose from 7.65 percent in 1963 to 16.45 percent in 1996. As Figure 2 
illustrates, this augmentation occurred basically in the younger age groups. For 
example, for the 15-19 age group the ratio multiplied by more than three times. Among 
the years, the change is less pronounced, even having a negative sign for the elderly, as 
it is documented in the four consecutives census (1963, 1975, 1985, 1996).  
 
Figure 2.  
 Source: INE with data from census. 
 
Another fact that mainly caused the decrease in the number of married couples is 
the rise in the average age at getting married, both for men and women. As shown in 
Figure 3, on average, in 2002 men are getting married at 32, that is around two years 
older than they did in 1975. Likely, the average age of women at reaching marriage 
grown from around 26 in 1975 to more than 29 in 2002.  
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Figure 3.  
 
Source: Population Programme. School of Social Sciences. 
UdelaR.  
“Nuevas Formas de Familia” – (UNICEF – UDELAR, 2003, 80). 
 
Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics 
Note: The years 1955-67 and 1989-92 are estimated values by the INE 
 
 
Figure 4 plots the gross birth rate in Uruguay for the period 1900-2001.  It is 
clearly seen a diminishing trend in the rate, which is more than halved in the whole 
century, falling from around 33 births per 1,000 inhabitants in 1900 to around 15,5 in 
2001. However, the share of births out of wedlock in total of births rose near 70 percent, 
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climbing from around 26 in 1900 to around 45 in 2001. Figure 5 presents the evolution 
of the rate, which remained inside a range of 20 and 30 percent until the beginnings of 
the 80´s, when it rocketed to almost 50 percent. 
 
Figure 5.  
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics, with information from Statistics Division of the Ministry 
of Public Health 
 
 
Table 1 documents the fact that the main increase in the percentage of births out 
of wedlock was registered in the younger age group of the mothers. For mothers 
between 15 and 24 years old, the rate was more than doubled during the last two 
decades. Although there was an increment too for the other age groups of mothers, this 
was of less scale. 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Percentage of births out of civil wedlock, according to age group of mothers            
  (Uruguay, 1970-2000) 
Age group 1970 1980 1988 1993 1997 2000 
15-19 26,4 32,0 47,9 60,0 71,3 76,2 
20-24 17,6 28,5 30,5 41,6 54,9 59,9 
25-29 14,9 23,0 20,9 27,0 37,5 41,0 
30-34 12,3 18,2 21,2 25,8 33,0 27,7 
Total 21,3 24,9 28,0 36,5 47,7 48,1 
 Source: Peri and Filgueira, 1993 and Ministry of Public Health, 1999 and 2001; From: “Nuevas Formas de 
Familia” – (UNICEF – UDELAR, 2003, 86) 
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As Table 2 reports, the majority of all women with children are married. 
Nevertheless, if only are considered the women between 15 and 24 years old, married 
ones do not reach the 50 percent. Even for the total of all the mothers with children, 
around  9 percent are either separated or divorced. And around 8 percent are solo 
mothers. That means that approximately one of six non-widowed women with children 
lives in a single-parent household.   
 
Table 2 
Distribution of the women with children by conjugal state. Census 1996 
  
Free Union Married 
Divorced / 
Separated Widow  Singles Total 
% of women 
with children 
15-19 24,9 30,6 2,5 0,2 41,8 100 13,9 
20-24 26,0 48,9 5,0 0,3 19,8 100 40,7 
25-29 19,7 64,4 6,6 0,4 8,9 100 65,2 
30-34 15,5 70,3 8,3 0,6 5,3 100 82,1 
35-39 13,8 70,2 10,5  1,1 4,3 100 88,2 
40-44 11,9 69,9 12,1  2,4 3,8 100 89,4 
45-49 9,6 69,3 13,3  4,5 3,3 100 88,9 
Total 15,6 65,6 9,4 1,6 7,8 100   
Source: Population Programme. School of Social Sciences. UdelaR. “Nuevas Formas de Familia”. – (UNICEF – UDELAR, 2003, 87)                                
 
 
Below, in Figure 6, it can be find another stylised fact of Uruguay  that is present in worldwide 
trends: the augment ation in the participation of women in labour market.  
 
Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Institute of Statistics  
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Table 3 
Distribution of families by type of household - Montevideo – 2001 
 Percentage of the total of households  
Single person families4 18,4 % 
Nuclear 60,5 % 
Couple without children 16,4 % 
Couple with children 33,9 % 
Single parent with children 10,2 % 
Extended 18,3 % 
Compounded 2,8 % 
Total 100 % 
Source: Program  of Population. School  of  Social Sciences. UdelaR. From: “Nuevas  Formas de Familia” 
– (UNICEF-UDELAR, 2003) 
 
 
As Table 3 reports, nuclear families are the most predominant types of 
household in Uruguay. 
   
 “In Uruguay the extended households are the most affected by poverty, 
followed by the couples with children and the single -parent  families...” 5.  
 
Also, the distribution of buildings for poor people is not an irrelevant matter. 
Recent data (source: INE, 1998) shows that 348 illegitimate neighbourhoods are in 
Montevideo and surroundings. 132,400 persons live in 32,203 buildings in those places 
(they represent 11.5 percent of the population of Montevideo). Moreover,  this trend 
should have increased during the last economic recession.  The formation of new 
households by young couples seems to have played an important role in the 
augmentation of the illegitimate neighbourhoods6. “...31 percent of the people of the 
inquiry state that the cause to have moved themselves to illegitimate neighbourhoods 
was the formation of a new household” 7.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
4 “Single parent families”= Mother or Father only with one or more children; 
“Extended families” = Families with more than two generations in the same unit, for example when 
grandparents cohabit with married children and the relative grandchildren; 
“Compounded families” = Nuclear or extended families plus other persons who are not relatives.  
5 Vigorito, Andrea. “Arreglos familiares y bienestar económico de los niños en Montevideo” in 
(UNICEF-UDELAR, 2003). 
6 Amarante, V. y Caffera, M. 2003.  “Los factores determinantes de la formación de asentamientos 
irregulares”. Revista de Ciencias Empresariales y Economía. Universidad de Montevideo, page 66. 
7 Amarante, V. 2004. “Economía y Mercado”, “El País”, page 4, January 22th. 2004. 
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II: Law and Incentives Framework 
 
 
“The legal system has a very deep effect on the economic system 
and is able to, in some sense, control it” (Coase, 1994, 11). 
 
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they 
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. (…) 
Institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals” (North, 1998, 3). 
 
The laws (constitutions, decrees, resolutions,...) of any society are formal rules 
which give the institutional framework. In this sense, the legal system form a 
motivational structure which gives rewards and penalties. If there is no law that states 
the need to pay debts, the debtors probably wouldn’t pay and finally people would be 
discouraged to lend money. When the law punishes firms that pollute water, a signalling 
is being sent to  those firms in order to make them avoid to contaminate water. When 
the law obliges the cigarettes firms to advise clearly to there customers that “Smoking is 
bad for health”, the law is encouraging people no to buy cigarettes. And so on.  
“Institutional constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, 
sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake certain 
activities” (North, 1998, 4).  
 
One target of this article is to analyse the formal institutions (“the rules of the 
game”) which may be producing  positive incentives or disincentives towards the family 
(“the players”).  
 
Videla (2003) gives us references about Stark’s (1995), Kranton’s (1996) 
models, and the dynamics studies of Sacco and Zamagni (1997).  
 
Oded Stark’s model arrives to the conclusion that if self-motivated market 
relationships are replaced by altruistic ones, the final result will be a superior market 
optimum. This outcome is based on the fact that altruism produces trust and highly 
reduces the transaction costs. This altruistic behaviour is promoted by the family 
because it is an environment where takes place a large number of these unselfish 
transactions.     
 
Contrary  to the market exchange, Kranton defines the “reciprocal exchange” as 
those informal relationships in which people agree to exchange goods and services for 
future compensation.  There is a mutual trust and respect among the people who take 
part in this exchange, and also this relationship is based on non-written but very well 
known rules. This behaviour is typical of the family. This reciprocal exchange may be 
more efficient than the market itself, reveals Kranton.       
 
The dynamic studies of  Sacco and Zamagni show that people rationally choose 
either altruistic or selfish strategies.  In other words, behaving as an altruist or selfish is 
not an inherited condition, what happens is that an agent observes the other agents and 
chooses his most convenient strategy in terms of welfare. This conduct to altruist and 
selfish behaviour in the society.      
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These  models show that institutions and rules can strengthen selfish or altruist 
behaviour, market exchange, “reciprocal exchange”. That is why the motivation 
structure, created by the laws, is so relevant, therefore it is very important to be careful 
at legislating in order not to produce negative effects. Not only the policies for the 
family are important, but also all those policies (building, education, work…) which 
produce adverse motivational-effects indirectly over the family, because they could be 
motivating selfish and not altruist conducts, which would go against the welfare of 
society.        
 
To be able to understand this statement, we need to consider the economic benefits that families 
give to the society.  
 
 
III. Links Between Family and Economy 
 
 
“the family continues to fulfill a crucial function, 
but this function is not carried out in the same 
way in all families” (Belardinelli, 2004) 
 
 
As a result of the recent trends which intent to reach reconceptualizations 
of marriage and family under influence if ideas about individual rights and 
neutrality toward diverse life-styles 8, it is necessary to define which concept of 
“family” we are using in this paper before showing the “Links Between Family 
and Economy”.  
 
Donati (2004) argues that not all forms of co-habitation could be called 
“family”: this is not a discriminatory criterion, but, on the contrary, it respects the 
characteristics of the relations chosen by the subjects (persons could create 
multiple forms of co-habitation –all the different situations of living together - in 
which there is no assumption of social responsibility towards the community 
around and, thus, they could not be called families). “We must never confuse 
mere co-habitation with that specific relationship which we call, in the real sense 
and not analogically or generally, family”.  
 
Also, in the present paper, we avoid the term “traditional family”: 
Belardinelli (2004) states that “the term traditional family is itself quite 
ambiguous, due to the fact that the adjective traditional takes  us back to the past, 
to the families of yesteryear, to a type of family that in many ways no longer 
exists: the so-called extended family with many children, grandparents living 
under the same roof, a rigid definition of roles, a more or less marked 
subordination of the women, rather linear inter-generational relationships and 
routine social functions carried out almost automatically”. Taking into account 
the arguments of Donati and Belardinelli, the definition adopted in this paper is to 
identify family with a stable union of a man and a woman, their children and, 
possibly, other relatives; a specific relationship with common goals. In other 
                                              
8 Glendon (2004) offers a clear and extended summary of the significant trends in family law and the 
process of reconceptualization of marriage and family in the late twentieth century . 
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words, we refer to what is known as “extended families” and/or “normal-
constituted nuclear families” in Rossi (2004)  classification.           
 
 
a. Natural Insurance for the Old, Sick and Unemployed 
 
Every family is like an insurance policy against the ageing problem: the 
grandparents with little resources are sustained by the incomes of the rest of the family; 
if those grandparents where alone, the State should take care of them spending money, 
and perhaps in the wrong way. Becker (1987) shows that: “ relative’s altruism and care 
has helped to protect the members of a family against the uncertainties and dangers of 
childhood and  the old age”.    
 
This home could also be seen as an insurance policy against illnesses and 
unemployment: if a member of this home suffers from one of these troubles he would be 
supported by the rest of the family (avoiding the State’s expenditure or helping to 
substitute it). For this reasons the family is recognised as “ the school for humanity and 
social virtues”: taking care of the children, the weak, the ill, the old, the poor people; 
learning the value of reciprocal service.     
  
b.  Human Capital Investments  
 
Each family could be building an efficient mechanism of children’s growing-up 
and investment in human capital, where parents devote resources to technical formation 
(educational expenditure) and put in practice cultural and moral costumes. Families are 
influential in many dimensions of their children’s lives, affecting their future 
performance (and the society itself). “As an important concept, the family teaches about 
our ethic behaviour and our virtues, creating human capital in the real meaning: men 
and women, willing to arrive to an agreement, to compromise themselves, to trust in 
people and help them. Without these ethic and social foundations, it is impossible to 
develop a solid economy” (Becker, 1996). Trust and confidence are very relevant 
factors for economic development. “(Aguirre, 1999, 5) Gary Becker, in his theory of 
human capital, when considering investment in human beings (education) and its effect on 
real economic growth, points out that "no discussion of human capital can omit the 
influence of families on the knowledge, skills, values, and habits of their children”. 
 
Videla (2003, 35) quotes the experiment ordered by Frederich the II of 
Hohenstaufen who wanted to investigate the primary language of humankind. 
According to the story, the king ordered to confine many orphans  to a house still in 
lactation and ordered his servants to take care of them but without talking or showing 
them any affective sign. The children didn’t started to talk, they died soon. This 
indicates the need of affection at the bringing-up: the family is the typical institution 
oriented in this sense.  
 
Consider for example about the role of the mother and the father in the teaching 
of moral costumes in order to prevent early childbearing, which “is of particular concern 
because of its implications for the accumulation of human capital. Adolescents who 
became mothers are at elevated risk of interrupting their schooling permanently” (Cox 
Edwards, 2003, 9). 
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“It is said that adolescence is a time of enormous opportunity and enormous 
risks; scientists believe that the way in which teens spend these years has a crucial 
impact on the final development and structure of the brain. Where adolescents live, 
moreover, can shape the way they spend their time and the decisions they make. In the 
Latin American region, it is estimated that 95% of adolescents live with their parents 
and/or other adults, which suggests that adolescents’ opportunities regarding basic 
living standards and access to schools are strongly influenced by the household where 
they reside” (Cox Edwards et a l., 2003, 1). In Cox Edwards et al. (2003, 10), the authors 
also try to gauge the importance of family factors in the decision of the adolescents to 
only work, work and study, or only study. “As adolescents and young adults gradually 
leave school for good, they are faced with a new set of decisions. They must choose 
whether to look for work, and upon finding employment, they must decide how much to 
work. Also, they will make choices regarding the occupation and the industry where 
they will work”.      
 
Zamagni (2004) states that “the family is the ideal type of environment for 
nurturing human resources in the individual. Interaction among members, including 
spill over effects, permits a reciprocal exchange of knowledge and this increases, of its 
own accord,  the stock of human resources. Within its structure, systematic transference 
of knowledge between the members takes place, a transference which is encouraged by 
intimacy and family ties. This is why where family structures are more solid, coeteris 
paribus, the effective stock of acquired abilities of the individuals is greater and the 
average productivity of the system higher”.  
 
 
c. Preventing Drop-outs 
 
Cox Edwards et al. –editors- (2003)9 affirms that “while access to education 
cannot be defined as the major problem in the region (Latin America), drop-out rates 
remain a daunting challenge leading to low schooling rates and low overall educational 
achievements” 
 
In the case of Uruguay, at age 15 the drop-out rate reaches 22,2 percent. “The 
early drop-out in this country cannot be attributed to problems of educational supply”. 
 
“Many Latin American countries have invested considerable economic resources 
in order to improve their educational supply, particularly in terms of school 
infrastructure, human and material resources, and innovative strategies to make schools 
more appealing to students. For the most part however, politicians, experts and 
policymakers show frustration with the small returns on the investments made so far, as 
policies are simply not producing the expected outcomes. The key to this failure is not 
on the supply side but on the demand side: little is known regarding how and why the 
targeted population behaves as it does. Thus, the primary focus of diagnosis and policy 
should go from supply to demand”.  
 
And in the demand side of education, the family plays a crucial role.       
 
                                              
9 Filgueira, Carlos; Filgueira, Fernando and Fuentes, Alvaro. “School Attainment and Transitions to 
Adulthood in Latin America” (Chapter Five of Cox Edwards et al., 2003).  
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“In order to guide policy appropriately, it is necessary for researchers to open the 
black box where structural and personal factors interact to produce educational 
outcomes. This interaction involves adolescents’ choices and behaviour as they move 
into adult life”. 
 
“Demographic factors are important, especially the share of extended 
households, which affect hazard rates for educational attainment. Countries at the 
beginning of their demographic transitions confront huge obstacles in increasing their 
educational performance, and their only advantage may lie in extended households and 
the protective function they provide”. 
 
“Uruguay represents the opposite scenario. Among lower-income sectors, the 
simultaneous adoption of very “modern” roles and family structures, has left a vacuum 
of basic integrative and protective mechanisms. This has resulted in very weak 
educational demand among the lower income groups.” 
 
Then, family matters to understand and solve drop-out rates and education 
attainment.  
 
 
d.  Mechanism of Socializing 
 
Households could also be an efficient mechanism of people’s socialization. 
Kaztman y Filgueira (2001) point out that biparental and stable families present the 
lowest percentages of teenagers who do not study, do not work and are not willing to 
work (a constant disaffiliation of educational and job institutions may cause teenagers 
serious problems because it destroys the contacts with the sources of knowledge, job 
experience and society which is the same as an interruption of the process of 
incorporation of the most important goods to approach to a welfare future). The family 
constitutes a large number of relationships between the people: these relationships  
introduce and support every people in the society: relationships in marriage, paternity, 
filiations, fraternity. 
 
Belardinelli (2004) says that “we must not forget that, so that discussion and 
contractual agreements can have their place, we need a society which has a particular 
type of attitude arising from trust, a sense of the common good, tolerance and 
responsibility. This cannot be produced by contract, but only through the long process 
of socialization which starts in the family and continues in schools and all other 
institutes where there are social relations”. (…) “ empirical research tells us that many 
young people seem not to exist as a generation . They have no sense of belonging to 
anything or anyone. They do not feel as if they have been generated and believe that 
they in turn are not capable of generating anything of significance. One could say they 
are without roots and without future. (…) Young people especially seem to find it 
difficult to have a sense of their heritage and of the fact that they can also pass this on 
(…) the family can offer the best environment for safeguarding this sense of a 
generational chain”. 
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e. Economies of Scale  
 
In this families the existence of economies of scale ( savings generated by the 
large number of people living at home) is very common: it takes down the costs per 
capita of food, building, education,.. 
 
When there are problems at home, the fixed costs could be multiplied and the 
economics of scale are reduced. This could crack the transferences of the progenitor 
who is not resident and finally, this failed transference prejudices the woman because, 
in Uruguay, “in the majority of cases, children of broken marriages still live with their 
mothers” 10. We can see this idea in the English case: “in the 60´s in fact the fathers 
where allowed to dedicate their incomes to support the new-created homes while the 
State was in charge of the old family by the new Social Security System. Then, only 16 
percent of the payments made for single parent families was recovered. The authorities 
had the power to put pressure but they never did it because according to  Finner 
Committee the real problem of the support is not that the man is not willing to pay, the 
problem is that they are not able to pay. There isn’t enough money to live.” 
(Universidad de los Andes, 2002, 73). 
 
That is why, when there are some problems in the family, there could be 
possible troubles in the intergenerational  transferences of possessions. Videla (2003, 
105) affirms: “In Argentina, for instance, the father who is divorced often avoids his 
essential (food)  obligations with the children of his first woman, either because of lack 
of concern, or because he is not able to support two families in case he get married 
again.” This means that the State must increase its expenditures in order to do what the 
father does not carry out or does wrong. The State takes part in the post-marriage 
relationship to force the parts to accomplish the justice’s resolutions, but this 
intervention is expensive and it means that society must pay pay more taxes   
 
 
f. Society Stability 
  
 
Videla (2003, pages 92-93) affirms that the family also contributes to the harmony 
and stability of all the society because it encourages people to act in a cooperative way. 
According to this point, Videla cites works from Sen (2000), Becker (1987) y Cabrillo 
(1996). Sen uses game theory to show that the strategy based on cooperation has more 
advantages and the couple obtains better and more efficient individual results. Becker 
affirms that in a family which behaviour is dominated by  the parents  altruism, a 
cooperative behaviour is more reasonable, even with a selfish motivation. In other 
words, Cabrillo proves the proposition which says that it would be more reasonable to 
establish consecutive  marriage -contracts of short term so as to low down the 
uncertainness and high up the participant’s welfare: however, cooperative games show 
that if cooperative will exists at the beginning, the most efficient model is the long-term 
contract or the perpetual contract.  “(Aguirre, 1999, 4) It is within the family domain that 
private property encounters its meaning because it is in the family that the economic agent 
                                              
10 Bucheli, Marisa. “Transferencias y visitas entre hijos y padres no corresidentes” in (UNICEF-
UDELAR, 2003). Aprox. 95 percent of the people below 18 years old live with their mother (cfr. 
Vigorito, Andrea: “Arreglos familiares y bienestar económico de los niños en Montevideo”). 
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finds motivation to work.  At the same time, it is in the family where pure selfish motives 
for economic activity are overcome because the person's work is directed to meet the needs 
of the other members of that family.”   
 
In the family the people are recognised because of what they are and not because 
of what they have. Videla (2003, 38)  affirms  this fact is very relevant because “the 
market economy, which works by competition, is creating constantly losers and 
winners. The rescue and support of the permanent or temporary loser’s self-confidence 
is the first task of the family. Without this function of socia l stability, the market 
correction, should logically behave as   Herbert Spencer’s version of struggle of life and 
the endurance of the stronger. The family allows many losers of the competence process 
to find the sense of life”.   
 
g. Mechanism of income distribution 
 
Zamagni (2004) argues that a positive influence of the family on welfare 
concerns the integration and redistribution of earnings. “The capacity of a family to 
balance the distribution of earnings for the individual is well known. This becomes 
even more egalitarian when it passes from the individual to the family as a whole. In 
this sense, the family becomes a powerful social “cushion”, serving as a reference point 
for collecting and apportioning the earnings of its own members and functioning in this 
way as an efficient distributor of its own wealth”. 
__________________ 
 
“The family is a natural institution which 
often does  those things much better than 
other bigger institutions”(Becker, 1996). 
 
These positive consequences over the society, me ntioned above, are known in 
the economical literature as externalities. Definitely, externalities are effects which  an 
agent’s activity (in this case the family) has in others (the rest of the society) and is not 
necessarily noticed by the market prices: in other words, as we saw before, these homes 
may have many profitable consequences for the society (insurance for aging, 
unemployment, and sicknesses;  human capital investment; socialisation mechanisms; 
economies of scale..) however the society do not pay back these families their benefits 
(what is more, laws and regulations could be punishing! many times these families). In 
consequence, these families are not rewarded for their “production”, they are motivated 
to low the “production”  of this kind of goods (insurances for aging, unemployment, 
sicknesses, human capital investment, socialisation) and that is why not only those 
families are damaged but also the whole society because “ the raise of familiar 
instability (...) is increasing the isolation of the  poor urban people and activates 
mechanisms that gives advantage to intergenerational reproduction of poverty, which is 
a threat for the children who will live with more poverty in the future”  (Kaztman and 
Filgueira. 2001, 117). 
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IV. Family Breakdowns and The Children 
 
In this section I will centralise in the positive externalities over the children.  
 
a) Effects of familiar instability over the educational and social performance of 
children  
 
Some authors (C. Filgueira, 1996; Kaztman 2001) point out the negative 
consequences of conjugal instability on the socialization and educational levels of the 
children. In this logic, family breakdowns deteriorate the intergenerational transmission 
of actives mechanisms and attempt against the future of children. 
 
Other investigations (UNICEF-UDELAR, 2003) 11 doubt about the causal 
relationship between families breakdowns and welfare of the future generations, and 
they state that:  
 
i. It is necessary to distinguish the short-term effects and the 
long-term effects (it is in the short term where the harmful 
effects on the children could be critical);  
 
ii. it is necessary to study the differential effects according to the 
gender and age of children at the moment of the breakdown; 
 
iii. even if there is no divorce, the children experiment problems 
in their psycho-social performance when their parents are in 
trouble;  
                                           
   
 
This controversy between these positions has contributed to discover the 
complexity of the relationship between conjugal instability and the children’s 
performance. 
 
 
    b) Familiar stability and absence of parental conflict is favourable to 
the children. 
 
Conjugal stability has been a good mechanism of transmission of assets from 
parents to their children. When breakdowns are produced, the relationship between the 
children and one of the progenitors 12 is harmed, damaging the transmission of assets. 
This effect is more noticeable after more years13. Bucheli14 (UNICEF – UDELAR, 
                                              
11 Cabella, Wanda. “Efectos del divorcio sobre el desem peño educativo y social de los niños”. 
 
12 Universidad de Los Andes (Chile). 2002. “Informe sobre el divorcio. La evidencia empírica 
internacional”, page 49. 
 
13 Universidad de Los Andes (Chile). 2002. “Informe sobre el divorcio. La evidencia empírica 
internacional”, página 49. 
 
14 Bucheli, Marisa. “Transferencias y visitas entre hijos y padres no corresidentes”. 
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2003) affirms that, in Uruguay, only “42 percent of fathers who doesn’t live with their 
children transfers some money where his children live” and 32 percent of the children 
have no contact with their father. Besides, Bucheli´s paper concludes that “ the 
constitution of a new union of any of the progenitors takes down the frequency of visits 
of the father”. The Universidad de los Andes (2002, 71) cites problems in the 
transferences similar to the Uruguayan case in United States, England, France and 
Sweden.  Videla (2003, 105) refers to the Argentinean case.   
 
 Furstenberg15 observes that “the majority of children have more possibilities of 
prosperity when they receive a continuous care of their parents, when they invest in the 
relationship, when they provide money and resources, when they control their children 
actions in a confident way according to their age, and when they show their affection, 
interest and trust in their abilities. All these qualifications are supported, without any 
doubt, by the presence of both parents”. They point out that it should be studied if the 
substitution of the relative by other person is as effective as if it where with the 
progenitor.  
 
To conclude this part: different reasons are presented about the level of the 
damage caused by familiar breakdowns on the children. Burt what we can affirm is that 
familiar stability has a positive influence in the children and hence, it is a common good 
for the whole society. In other words, familiar stability provided by the parents has 
proved to be a good-working mechanism to transmit social and human capital to the 
children. It works.    
 
V. Family vs. Larger Organizations?  
 
Above, we observed that many countries recently experienced huge changes on 
family structure and households decision making: lower fertility rates and drop in the 
number of children for younger cohorts; growth of divorces and of labour force 
participation of women; ageing population; people waiting longer to get married.  
 
Towards these changes that are affecting the family, we should question the 
convenience of going to: a) societies where other organisations, like the Welfare State, 
will take the families´ place in the supply of services because the family can’t provide 
them in these new circumstances; or b) make the family receive satisfactory incentives 
so as to strengthen it so it can plenty offer its services.   
 
Lindbeck (1995) affirms that, contrary to the possibility of increase the presence 
of the welfare state, we should remember its perverse dynamic: when an aid is given, 
the number of users grow with time.   
 
“The achievements and costs of modern welfare state are both usually analysed 
in static terms. Some consequences of welfare-state arrangements, however, could 
rather be characterized as dynamic, in the sense of reflecting the interacting adjustments 
over time of basic behaviour patterns of households, firms, interest-group organizations, 
politicians and public -sector administrators. Many of these dynamic adjustments are no 
doubt regarded by most observers as positive, or virtuous. 
 
                                              
15 Furstenberg Jr., Frank. “El cambio familiar estadounidense en el último tercio del siglo XX”. 
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Other dynamic adjustments are more problematic and “hazardous”. 
 
But if we do not watch out for hazardous dynamics, there is a risk that the 
welfare state will destroy its own economic foundations. That risk is today a reality in 
several countries.  
 
The basic dilemma of the welfare state, however, is that the more generous the 
benefits, the greater will be not only the tax distortions but also, because of moral 
hazard and benefits cheating, the number of beneficiaries. This is a field where Say`s 
law  certainly holds in the long run: the supply of benefits creates its own demand. 
Indeed, moral hazard and cheating are, in my judgement, the weakest spots of the 
welfare state” (Lindbeck, 1995). 
 
Another problem which is presented when the family is substituted by a group of 
structures and organizations was signed by Hayek against Lange and Lerner´s 
solution16: the information is atomised in thousands of particles and it is impossible for 
any centralized organization to reach it on time. 
 
Lange (1904-65) and Lerner (1905-82) tried to demonstrated the virtual equivalence 
between central planning and the free market in the efficient allocation of resources by 
an iterative “trial-and-error” procedure. In their view, Socialism must be able to 
combine efficient allocation of resources with a distribution of income which 
maximizes collective welfare (this involves the elimination of private ownership and the 
disasters caused by cyclical fluctuations in a market economy). “In replay to this 
argument, von Hayek (1899-92) developed his interpretation of the operation of the 
market as a discovery process, in which information scattered among a myriad of 
economic agents is mobilized and used in an efficient way. (…) Each individual is a 
unique repository, maintained Hayek, of specific elements of knowledge, and it is only 
through free interaction among the economics agents that this scattered knowledge is 
disseminated beneficially to whole society. (…) Yet individuals are the only repository 
of the relevant information.” Reasoning by analogy, the members of the family, rather 
than larger organizations, are usually in a better position to reach the information of the 
necessities of the other parts of the family: before the State detects it, the mother will 
hear the cry of her baby.    
 
VI. Policy Suggestions  
 
For further research, the present paper suggests the study of the implementation 
of formal incentives which empower the family and, at the end, foster economic 
development.  
 
Donati (2004) summarizes the principal models of family policy inherited from 
the 20th century and proposes new principles for family policy able to promote a society 
that is “family-friendly”, rather than “family destructive”. Three models of family 
policy and their drawbacks: 
                                              
16 Screpanti and Zamagni (1995) offers an extended summary of this controversy in the history of 
economic thought.  
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i. Lib Model 
 
Its fundamental inspiring principle is one of individual liberty and 
the protection of privacy. The family is defined as a contractual 
institution between individuals: a joint venture of private 
individuals. 
 
ii. Corporate Model 
 
It is based on the assumption of the collective solidarity of the 
family: an institution based on complimentarily  between men and 
women, and on subsidiarity among generations. These 
relationships refer specially to social security and participation in 
the labour market.  
 
iii. Lab Model 
 
This model is based in the principle of social equality: the 
tendency is to make married and non married couples equal in 
what pertains to rights, duties and benefits.  
 
 
An outline of success/failure of the three models of family policies (from 
Donati, 2004): 
Models of family 
and welfare policies 
Pos itive aspects Negative aspects Overall valuation 
Lib Freedom of choice 
for the family 
Individualism and 
fragmentation 
The family becomes 
an utility/dis -utility 
for individuals 
Corporate Public support to 
family solidarity 
Lack of equity 
among men and 
women, and among 
generations 
The family becomes 
a support to the 
State (subsidiarity in 
reverse) 
Lab Equity and 
redistribution for the 
more disadvantaged 
conditions  
Poverty traps and 
loss of social bonds 
The family becomes 
a purely affective 
aggregate of 
individuals. 
 
Donati (2004) states that family policies are in crisis. Some of the reasons for the 
crisis: 
 
a) substituting family roles with services of the outside 
collectivity, the publicizing of familial functions: a logical 
outcome when support to the responsibilities of the family is 
given in a way which substitutes family roles with external 
collective services lacking a family-friendly attitude; 
b)  there is a strong tendency towards making family policies 
coincide with “matrifocal” policies centered on the woman and  
on the mother-child relationship. The consequence is a loss of 
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the masculine role and the weakening of the exchange between 
generations; 
c) family policies lose the explicit character of an instrument 
which would sustain family bonds. They concentrate on the 
needs of the single individual along her/his life cycle. One’s 
preference is to speak of policy for infancy, the youth, the aged, 
instead of policies for sons/daughters, parents, and 
grandparents.  
d)  To a large extent, family policies are turned into policies 
against poverty and against social exclusion, with a reductionist 
view of the social capital inherent to the family. 
 
 Donati suggests new orienting principles for family policies: 
 
 a. The collectivization or publicizing of functions should give way to a 
well understood principle of subsidiarity according to which larger social 
formations ought not substitute for smaller ones but rather support them in their 
autonomy, laying down rules and supplying necessary means so that they 
themselves can carry out their specific duties. Families should be in a position to 
decide: to choose the services they require and to be able to influence the way 
they are organized. The state should help them through further associative forms, 
such as associations of families, to manage on their own the services that they 
need. One thinks of family counseling services, day care centers, care for children 
and the elderly, domiciliary services, etc.  
 
Orientations already discussed (lib, lab, corporate) have a reduced vision 
of the subsidiaity principle for the following distinct reasons. (i) The lib model 
defines subsidiarity as freedom for the private spheres. For this model subsidiarity 
is privatization. (ii) The corporate model defines subsidiarity as assistance from 
the state. (iii) The lab model defines it as a delegation of the social policies to 
organisms controlled by the state or in some way dependent on its regulations. 
 
But a well understood principle of subsidiarity not only defends, but also 
promotes the family. It is not limited to defending the family from the 
interference of communities of higher orders, but actively sustains it in its 
autonomy, empowers the family. 
 
 b. A policy is defined as family-oriented if it is oriented according to a 
guiding distinction between the family well being and the non-family well being. 
Family-oriented policies are those which recognize the family as a social subject 
itself (those who marry give rise to a relationship of trust and cooperation, based 
on reciprocity, and this  creates social capital for themselves and for the 
community around them). On this basis this relationship ( = family) may claim 
the right to be recognized as a social and legal and referential subject accountable 
for its freedom and autonomy. 
 
 Glendon (2004) presents some propositions for family policy discussion: 
 
a. “The family form that state and society have the greatest interest in 
promoting is that which provides optimal conditions for child-raising 
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and thus is most important for the common future; the  stable child -
raising household with a married mother and father present. If this is 
correct, it is appropriate to single out for encouragement and 
preferential treatment married couple households where children are 
being or have been raised –just as it is appropriate to give special 
treatment to veterans and others who made sacrifices for the common 
good”. 
b.  “Society and the state also have interest in other households where 
children are being raised, but here the interests are of different kind: 
the social interest in providing all children with the best possible life-
chances and the social interest in responding to the needs of 
disadvantaged. But these social goals must be pursued without 
encouraging the proliferation of sub-optimal arrangements. If this is  
correct, it is appropriate to single out some non-marital child-raising 
households for special assistance”.  
 
Zamagni (2004) suggests other pillar for family policy. “If it is true that 
the family today is the principal producer of positive social influence in our 
society, economic support should be seen as restitution or compensation and not 
only, as it continues to be, as a question of compassion or paternalistic assistance. 
In other words, family policies cannot be confused with policies for the struggle 
against poverty which are also necessary”.  
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VII. Concluding Remarks  
 
“I believe that family is the most important 
institution in any society (…); in the long run 
those economies that will advance most 
rapidly will tend to have strong family 
structures…” (Becker, 2000). 
 
The family is an important decision-making entity in allocating the scarce 
resources, and plays a critic role in human capital investments in the children and 
adolescents. “In the year 2000 approximately 21 percent of the Latin American 
population was aged 10 to 19 according to UN population estimates. Comprising such a 
considerable share of the population, the current generation of adolescents is widely 
recognized as vital to the region’s future” (Cox Edwards, 2003, 2).   
 
The present research has considered the benefits (for further research: 
empirically estimations of them in our society would be relevant) that the family carries 
to the economy of any society (child rearing and human capital investment; social 
assistance for the elder ly, sick and unemployed; economies of scale; mechanism of 
socialization; prevents drop-outs; society stability; mechanism of income distribution).  
However, family structure has experienced dramatic changes as we have observed in the 
recent worldwide trends: these changes affect the benefits produced by the family. 
Those who propose to substitute the family for larger organizations have find critical 
problems such as Lindbeck and Hayek mentioned: the perverse dynamic of welfare state 
(moral hazard and benefits cheating) and the fact that the information is atomised in 
thousands of particles and it is impossible to any central organisation to reach it on time 
(the members of the family, rather than larger organizations, are usually in a better 
position to reach the information of the necessities of the other parts of the family).  
Thus, based on the fact that family stability and the absence of parental conflict seem to 
be favourable to the children and the human capital investment, in this paper we suggest 
to explore other directions for policy: family-friendly policies (i.e. policies that favour 
families and, so, foster economic development) in terms of Donati (2004).  
 
In the design of policies, it is important to consider that institutions evolve in 
response to individual incentives and affect the performance of political and economic 
systems. Formal rules influence transaction and production costs (costs for families to 
offer their services) and could induce economic stagnation or foster real development. It  
is necessary to work on incentives toward efficient institutions.  
 
For further research, this paper suggests to try to estimate empirically the 
possible costs for our society of breakdowns and instabilities of the family structure 
(Aguirre, 1999, shows s ome estimations of social welfare costs including social security 
plus family and health welfare expenditures for developed countries: they have 
experienced significant increases as their family institution has undergone a serious 
crisis). 
 
The family is a fundamental institution for the society and so it cannot be treated 
with careless. It requires a serious and prudent study. Gary Becker indicates: “The 
family is the most important institution of every society... the family plays a crucial role 
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in the reparation of the inefficiencies of the market-system... The family is responsible 
for the majority of the human capital investment in the children (knowledge, skills, 
health of people...). Given the fact that human capital is essential for the development of  
a modern economy, this role of the families is specially important... Human capital 
position people more than  machines in the center of economic progress... The family is 
crucial not only because of the human capital investment it carry outs, but also for the 
huge contributions to the formation of attitudes and values of the population: values like 
honesty, responsibility, hard work, determine not merely the quality of economic life, 
but also the political and social behavior of the persons” (Becker, 2002)    
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IX. Annex: Family-friendly Policies  
 
 
Below, the reader could find brief suggestions, by different authors, of family-friendly 
policies. These ideas may be useful for further research.   
 
Montano (2004) suggests:      
 
· “Familiar help: it is proposed to make easier the possibility of other 
people to help directly with economical support to poor families with the 
special intention  of being for the education and maintenance of the 
children. By this way, the children of poor families are not distant of 
their natural home, and they receive an efficient assistance when they 
need it. These benefactors could also be compensated if they are people 
as well as organizations”.  
 
· Conciliation between work and family: “In Canada, the Women Statute 
Council has begun to grant annual rewards to enterprises which take 
concrete initiatives to conciliate work and family. Some of these 
programs are: the job flexibility; the authorization to the work over 
distances; the compression of the job-week -more hours in less days-; 
the possibility of a part-time job, or sharing the day of work with another 
partner. It doesn’t matter the presence of the worker, what really matters 
is that  the job is done.  In Germany, part of the contributions of the 
workers from the pensions system, are established in relation to the 
number of children the worker has, because according to The German 
Constitutional  Court, “who has children is contributing to the survival 
of the Social Security System, and that is why they should enjoy of more 
benefits than the ones who are not contributing”.   
 
· Study fiscal stimulus in order to protect gravid women without causing 
an economic damage to the firm in which she works, avoiding the 
handicap which results of the possibility of become pregnant 17.     
 
 
Becker et al. (1996) suggests: 
  
· Taking into account the home labour in the GDP statistics, at least to 
demonstrate the great contribution of the mothers who assign part of their 
time to these tasks of the household. The equal rights and dignity of men and 
women justify the woman access to public functions and other professions. 
But the real promotion of woman also demands that the society recognize  
the value of her maternal and familiar role, respecting the freedom of wives 
and mothers in order to not force them to work out of home. 
 
                                              
17 In Cox Edwards et al. (2003), the authors show that in many cases the rules governing formal 
employment are inadequate and lead to discrimination against the young, women and part-time workers. 
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In this sense, Zamagni (2004) argues that “the idea that work is only that 
which is paid in the well accepted ways, that is what produces goods and services 
for the private market, is outdated. (…) Today we are in a situation where we can 
add to the monetary, those activities which are not monetary, that is those which 
have an implicit value and can be rewarded by the exchange of an equivalent. 
Even though it is true that there are obvious difficulties of a technical nature, 
some countries are developing the so-called satellite accounting  whereby they try 
to calculate unpaid work. According to the UNDP Report on Human 
Development, 1995, the value of non-monetary total production is estimated to 
be, worldwide, 16,000 billion dollars, corresponding to about 70 percent of the 
23,000 billion dollars of monetary activity. It does not take much to conclude that 
such an important part of the economy cannot continue for long to be left out of 
official statistics”. 
 
Becker et al. (1996) continues: 
 
· In some societies, the poorest families are damaged because of 
the lack of a real possibility of access to an education of good quality 
for their children. Parents should be free to choose the education of 
their children. 
 
· Families should be able to participate directly in the decisions 
of the education that their children receive at school. 
 
· Fiscal policies should not discriminate against spouses, large 
families and those people who care for the sick and the old ones. 
 
· Labor conditions and holydays should be  flexible in order to 
give some resources (such as time) for spouses: they are necessary for 
parents to care and educate their children. 
 
“Frequently, people regret the lack of time available to advocate to their family. 
But when the personal dedication for the job growths, damaging familiar life, finally 
this personal disequilibria damages precisely the job. The effects of an excess of work 
negatively affects our private life. The instability of the private life has negative effects 
on our productivity and labor relations”18. 
 
“We need to be aware that today the main obstacle to the formation of new 
families, and within them new births, is the fact that quite a lot of couples perceive it as 
impossible to make the trade-off between the demands of career and/or professional 
advancement and the need of dedicating the necessary attention to their children’s 
education. If things are seen in these terms, as seems to be the case, the urgent problem 
to face is that of finding specific types of time management, taking into consideration 
that the problem is not so much reducing the weekly or monthly hours of work as, 
something rather more complex, organizing the time spent on paid work in such a way 
as to permit people to adjust their working hours to their own needs in the different 
stages of their working lives and to allow businesses to reduce the costs of reorganizing 
their production process to fit the implementation of new ways of working. (...) It is in 
                                              
18 Aceprensa 52/04, April 14th. 2004. 
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the interests of a company to have men and women working for it who feel fulfilled and 
satisfied at a personal level because they have no conflict of needs between work and 
family” (Glendon, 2004). 
 
 In reference to the family access to proper buildings, Amarante y Caffera (2003) 
suggests some factors to correct in the Uruguayan case: 
  
- Problems in the supply of lands: there are public and private 
lands without use because of speculative reasons or because the 
legal rules which regulate the division of new lands is too 
restrictive in relation of the times of the demand; 
 
- Public policy on housing for the sector of low income seems to 
be insufficient or ineffective, without mentioning their huge cost. 
The authors suggests to study the possibility of implementing tax 
instruments to direct private investment (in building and 
services) to some neighborhoods; 
 
- The current policy of regularization of poor and illegitimate 
neighborhoods could create incentives in the wrong way: the 
people who illegally take a land, besides the implicit benefits 
(they don’t pay services of water, taxes…), obtain the property of 
the land by law. Moreover, when the property of their new house 
is regularized, the family has to pay public services (water, 
taxes...): an incentive to move to another illegitimate 
neighborhood. 
 
Amarante y Caffera conclude their paper suggesting the study of the possible 
convenience of a policy of vouchers for a long term solution.  The idea is to give 
vouchers to the sector of low income in order to offer to those people  the real 
possibility of rent a house. This policy of subsidies for renting could be cheaper than the 
current policy of regularization of illegitimate neighborhoods.  
 
Recently, the Ministry of Portugal has  presented a new plan of social actions 
towards the family: “100 compromises for a family policy”. “In the chapter of family 
work relations, this policy includes the approbation of an unemployment insurance that 
takes into consideration the number of children of the worker; incentives to part -time 
works… 
 
The government also promise to support specially those families with old and 
seriously ill members.  
 
The chapter of education includes the reduction of cost of school materials for 
children; free access to museums; courses for parents; promote cooperation of parents in 
the schools; guarantee real free choice in education for parents”19. 
 
Other measures to consider: 
                                              
19 Aceprensa 56/04,  April 21st. 2004. 
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- Improve the Policy of Subsidy per Children of the Family: (“the 
family subsidy program is very limited in Uruguay: it is 
estimated that 40 percent of children in households in the first 
decile of income distribution are left out. (…) In 1995, a change 
was approved in the design in order to redistribute the benefits 
toward the poorest strata, subjecting the coverage and amount of 
the allowance to the income of the couple responsible for the 
child. The entitlement for children in the care of couples with 
income over 10 national minimum wages (SMN) was eliminated. 
For the rest, the benefit was set at 16 percent or 8 percent, based 
on whether the income of the adults responsible for the child was 
lower or higher than six SMN, respectively. Although this 
favoured the lower income strata, the fall in the SMN in real 
terms has been gradually decreasing the amount of the benefit”20. 
 
- Give real possibilities to carry out a family and hold the 
appropriate resources for its maintenance - even in poor levels -;   
 
- Warrant proper conditions for domestic labour;  
 
- Make possible to families their expression and representation 
towards public, economic, social and cultural authorities; to 
favour the creation of associations between families and other 
institutions that allow them to promote their values and defend 
them from external attacks, such as from mass-media;  
 
- Medical, juridical and social protection for mother and 
childhood. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
20 Bucheli, M. 1997a “Equidad en las asignaciones familiares de Uruguay”. Quoted in Attanasio (2003). 
